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9 In general, evaluative facts (e.g., the fact that
10 knowledge is good, the fact that stealing
11 is wrong) are called objective if they obtain
12 independently of the beliefs and other attitudes
13 (e.g., desires, approvals, hopes, wishes, fears,
14 likings) of subjects. By contrast, evaluative facts
15 are subjective if they depend for their existence
16 on the beliefs or attitudes of subjects.
17 Description
18 The objective/subjective distinction is deployed
19 in several related ways within the philosophical
20 and psychological literature on welfare,
21 ▶well-being, ▶ happiness, prudential value,
22 and ▶ quality of life (hereafter, “welfare”).
23 There is controversy about whether the welfare
24 of human beings and other sentient creatures is
25 itself objectively or subjectively good. More
26prominently, there is a debate about whether the
27true theory of welfare treats welfare as objective
28or subjective. There is also considerable contro-
29versy concerning what makes theories objective
30and subjective in the first place.
31Objectivity and Subjectivity in Value Theory
32In general, evaluative facts (e.g., the fact that
33knowledge is good, the fact that stealing
34is wrong) are called objective if they obtain
35independently of the beliefs and other attitudes
36(e.g., desires, approvals, hopes, wishes, fears,
37likings) of subjects. By contrast, evaluative
38facts are subjective if they depend for their
39existence on the beliefs or attitudes of subjects.
40For example, if knowledge is good simply in and
41of itself, irrespective of whether people actually
42do or would desire it, then the fact that knowledge
43is good is objective – or equivalently, knowledge
44is an objective good or value. By contrast, if what
45makes stealing wrong is that certain people do
46or would disapprove of it, then the relevant
47evaluative fact is subjective – or equivalently,
48stealing is subjectively bad.
49Historically important ▶ ethicists can be
50classified as objectivists or subjectivists
51depending on whether they hold that the most
52important and fundamental evaluative facts are
53objective or subjective. Plato, Aristotle, Henry
54Sidgwick, G. E. Moore, and W. D. Ross are
55usually classified as objectivists. Moore in
56particular appears to hold a very strong form of
57objectivism according to which evaluative facts
58obtain independently of the very existence of
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59 creatures with minds or psychologies (Moore,
60 1903). On the other hand, Hume, James, Nietz-
61 sche, and Dewey are normally classed as subjec-
62 tivists. For such theorists, value and normative
63 reasons get into the world through the sentiments,
64 reactive attitudes, valuing activities, or purposes
65 of human beings. Other famous ethicists, such as
66 Hobbes, Kant, J. S. Mill, and Rawls, are more
67 difficult to classify, in part because there is con-
68 troversy about the interpretation of their views
69 and in part because their views combine objective
70 and subjective elements.
71 Objective and Subjective Theories of Welfare
72 Theories of welfare can also be classified as
73 objective or subjective or as hybrids. There is
74 more agreement among welfare theorists about
75 which theories are objective and subjective than
76 about precisely why they count as such.
77 Versions of the Objective List Theory, perfec-
78 tionism, Amartya Sen and Martha Nussbaum’s
79 capabilities approach, Richard Kraut’s
80 developmentalism, and Daniel Haybron’s self-
81 fulfillment theory are all objective theories of
82 welfare (see Murphy, 2001, Hurka, 1993, Sen &
83 Nussbaum, 1993Au1 , Kraut 2007, Haybron, 2008).
84 This is because they allow that at least some
85 conditions and activities are directly good for
86 one, whether or not one desires them, enjoys
87 them, takes satisfaction in them, or believes that
88 they are good. Conditions and activities thought
89 to have this status include knowledge, friendship,
90 love, moral virtue, the appreciation of beauty,
91 sensory awareness, mobility, and emotional
92 health.
93 By contrast, desire satisfactionism,
94 preferentism, L. W. Sumner’s life satisfactionism,
95 Valerie Tiberius’s values-based theory, and Dale
96 Dorsey’s judgment subjectivism are subjective
97 theories of welfare (see Feinberg, 1984, Sumner,
98 1996, Tiberius, 2008, Dorsey, 2012). This is
99 because they say that in order for something to be
100 directly good for one, one must desire or prefer or
101 enjoy it, or else derive satisfaction from it, or else
102 believe that it is good.
103 ▶Hedonism is a more controversial case. Fred
104 Feldman’s attitudinal hedonism construes the
105 building blocks of welfare as episodes of
106enjoyment taken in propositional objects
107(Feldman, 2004). This form of hedonism resem-
108bles other forms of subjectivism because it is
109based on personal attitudes; additionally, these
110attitudes may be conceptually linked with desire
111(Heathwood, 2006). However, other forms of
112hedonism construe pleasure as an experiential
113state or a family-resemblance class of such states
114(Crisp, 2005). These resemble the Objective List
115Theory, insofar as they claim that a particular
116experience is good for one, no matter whether
117one desires it, enjoys it, takes satisfaction in it,
118or believes it is good. For this and other reasons,
119some theorists have doubted hedonism’s subjec-
120tivist credentials (Dorsey, 2011, Fletcher, 2012).
121Other theories of welfare count as hybrids
122insofar as they combine objective and subjective
123elements. Of course, looked at in one way, most
124of the objective theories already mentioned are
125hybrids: for most of them allow that ▶ desire
126satisfaction, ▶ pleasure, or aim achievement is
127welfare-enhancing, but insist that other things
128like knowledge and friendship are also welfare-
129enhancing. Still, these are usually classed as
130objective theories. Paradigmatic hybrid theories,
131by contrast, require that the individual building
132blocks of welfare each have subjective and objec-
133tive elements. For example, Robert Adams pro-
134poses that welfare consists in the enjoyment of
135things that are objectively excellent or worth-
136while (Adams, 1999; cf. also Parfit, 1984;
137Scanlon, 1998; Arneson, 1999; Feldman, 2004;
138Appiah, 2005). Other approaches, while largely
139subjectivist, count as hybrids insofar as they
140claim that the preservation of the systems that
141make conation and goal-directed action possible
142is good for one (Raibley, 2012).
143Before examining the reasons for thinking that
144welfare must be either objective or subjective, let
145us further consider the nature of this distinction.
146Formulating it precisely has proven somewhat
147difficult.
148David Brink writes that “Subjective theories
149of value claim that the components of a valuable
150life consist in or depend importantly on certain of
151the individual’s psychological states. . . . By con-
152trast . . . objective theories of value claim that
153what is intrinsically valuable neither consists in
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154 nor depends importantly on such psychological
155 states” (pp. 220–1). One worry with this proposal
156 is that “psychological states” form a broad
157 category. A theory that says that the only
158 welfare goods are knowledge and the
159 appreciation of beauty would effectively say
160 that the valuable life consists in psychological
161 states. But this would not be a characteristically
162 subjective theory.
163 L. W. Sumner has written that, according to
164 subjective theories, having a favorable attitude
165 towards one’s life or some of its ingredients is
166 a necessary condition for one’s life to be going
167 well for one (Sumner, 1996, p. 38). By contrast,
168 he says, objective theories allow that one could be
169 well-off without favorably regarding one’s own
170 life or any of its ingredients (p. 38). Sumner does
171 not provide both necessary and sufficient condi-
172 tions for subjective theories, so this analysis is at
173 best incomplete. This necessary condition for
174 subjective theories may be approximately cor-
175 rect. However, it is not entirely clear that one
176 must have favorable attitudes towards the ingre-
177 dients of one’s life to be faring well on some
178 forms of desire satisfactionism and aim
179 achievementism: if one is satisfying one’s desires
180 (or getting what one aimed for), it may not matter
181 that one does not enjoy (or is not satisfied with)
182 what one gets. Furthermore, most objective the-
183 ories that have actually been defended do require,
184 at least for high levels of welfare, that one favor-
185 ably regard aspects of one’s life.
186 Sobel (2009) recommends a different way of
187 distinguishing between objective and subjective
188 theories. He writes: “Subjective accounts of well-
189 being maintain that one’s rationally contingent
190 non-truth-assessable pro-attitudes ground true
191 claims about what is good for one” (p. 336).
192 A problem is that this criterion may not correctly
193 classify versions of life satisfactionism and judg-
194 ment subjectivism. This is because judgments
195 that one’s life is satisfactory or that one is faring
196 well do seem to be truth-apt. Some forms of
197 subjectivism base welfare on truth-assessable
198 pro-attitudes.
199 Dorsey proposes that subjectivism requires
200 that “prudentially valuable states be endorsed by
201 the person for whom these states are valuable”
202(2011); he also writes that “subjectivism [states
203that] a person’s evaluative perspective, under the
204right conditions, determines that which is good
205for her, and how good it is for her” (2013, p. 1).
206While these formulations are suggestive and
207plausible, it is a little unclear what endorsement
208and a person’s evaluative perspective amount to.
209On account of the difficulties noted in this
210section, there may be no neat and precise way to
211distinguish between objective and subjective the-
212ories of welfare. Perhaps this is to be expected: as
213Fletcher notes, our taxonomies of welfare theo-
214ries are interest relative, and so they are not likely
215to reflect perfect joints in nature (Fletcher, 2012).
216Perhaps if some of the building blocks or main
217determinants of welfare are partly constituted by
218pro-attitudes (desires, attitudinal pleasures, lik-
219ings, values – perhaps also aims and intentions)
220or by judgments of satisfaction or beliefs that
221things are good for one, this is sufficient for
222a theory to be partially subjective. Of course,
223there are hybrid theories that are partially but
224not wholly subjective, insofar as they say that
225the contribution made by the building blocks of
226welfare to the value of one’s life depends on the
227objects of one’s pro-attitudes. Roughly speaking,
228the more a theory says that one’s welfare level
229depends on the objects of one’s pro-attitudes – or
230on things besides one’s pro-attitudes, judgments,
231and beliefs – the more objective the theory is.
232Is Welfare Objective or Subjective?
233Arguments for welfare’s objectivity aim to show
234that subjective theories have unacceptable impli-
235cations about the welfare of individuals who pur-
236sue trivial, worthless, masochistic, or immoral
237ends. A person who simply desires – and enjoys –
238scratching an itch, counting blades of grass, or
239knocking down icicles is surely not faring well
240(Plato’s Philebus; Rawls, 1971, Kraut, 1994).
241Those who aim for, achieve, and enjoy great
242fame and wealth – or revenge upon their ene-
243mies – do not seem to benefit proportionally
244(Kraut, 2007). A person who desires and enjoys
245pain, bodily mutilation, and humiliation – and
246gets all these things – is not normally thought to
247be faring well (Carson, 2000; Raibley, 2012).
248Finally, a person who desires and enjoys
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249 inflicting harm on others does not appear to be
250 faring especially well.
251 But on the other hand, if a person does not like
252 or enjoy his life – and if he does not get anything
253 that he wanted or set out to achieve – it does not
254 seem that it can plausibly be called a good life for
255 him (cf. Adams, 1999, p. 95). And so it seems that
256 there is also some kernel of truth in the neighbor-
257 hood of subjectivism.
258 Sumner famously argues that objective theo-
259 ries of welfare such as the Objective List Theory
260 and perfectionism fail to capture welfare’s “char-
261 acteristically positional or perspectival charac-
262 ter” (Sumner, 1996, p. 43). He concludes that
263 “subjectivity turns out to be a necessary condition
264 of success in a theory of welfare” (Sumner, 1996,
265 p. 27).
266 Sumner has several arguments for this conclu-
267 sion. One, which we can call the weak argument,
268 claims that any plausible theory of welfare must
269 “make your well-being depend on your own con-
270 cerns: the things you care about, attach impor-
271 tance to, regard as mattering, and so on” (Sumner,
272 1996, p. 42). It is then claimed that objective
273 theories that accord no importance to a subject’s
274 hedonic and emotional states, conative attitudes,
275 or judgments of satisfaction cannot tie welfare to
276 one’s own concerns in this way. Therefore, such
277 objective theories are unacceptable. This argu-
278 ment is persuasive, but it merely establishes that
279 pro-attitudes or beliefs of the right sort be
280 included among the direct determinants of wel-
281 fare. But some objective and hybrid theories do
282 include these states (Arneson, 1999; Adams,
283 2003; Appiah, 2005; Fletcher, 2013).
284 A second argument can also be found in Sum-
285 ner. The first premise of what we can call the
286 strong argument states the subject relativity of
287 welfare: “the prudential value of my life is its
288 value for me . . .” (p. 42). That is, welfare value
289 is a form of value for a subject, as opposed to for
290 the world or for mankind or for no one in partic-
291 ular; it has a “characteristically positional or per-
292 spectival character” (p. 37, p. 43). Since
293 subjective theories of welfare say that welfare is
294 largely or wholly constituted by perspectival atti-
295 tudes – i.e., attitudes anchored in a subject’s per-
296 spective – they afford the best explanation of this
297fact: “welfare is subject-relative because it is
298subjective” (p. 43). Accordingly, some subjective
299theory of welfare must be true: we could not have
300an account of welfare’s nature that made no ref-
301erence to the subjective experiences of the par-
302ticular subject. This argument seems
303inconclusive. It might establish that welfare
304does not turn entirely on non-experiential prop-
305erties of the subject. But whoever held that it did?
306Sumner seems to be claiming that the positional
307or perspectival character of welfare value (the
308fact that it is value for a subject) requires that
309welfare be given a strictly subjective treatment.
310But it is not explained why this is so (Sobel,
3111997).
312Another popular argument for subjectivism
313about welfare turns on the internalism require-
314ment (Rosati, 1996). This requirement states that,
315if something, x, is good for a subject, S, then
316S must be capable of being motivated to pursue
317or promote x. Peter Railton explains the main
318idea behind this requirement as follows: “[W]
319hat is intrinsically valuable for a person must
320have a connection with what he would find in
321some degree compelling or attractive, at least if
322he were rational and aware” (Railton, 2002, p.
32347). Some reason that if this requirement is true,
324then some version of subjectivism is true. How-
325ever, the requirement itself is difficult to inter-
326pret. What precisely is it to “be capable of being
327motivated to pursue or promote” something?
328Additionally, there is a worry that this use of the
329internalism requirement is question-begging,
330because the requirement itself is just subjectivism
331stated in another way. For further discussion of




336▶Good Life, Theories of
337▶Happiness
338▶ Preference Satisfaction Theories
339▶Wellbeing, Philosophical Theories of
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